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Jan De Houwer 1*, Niclas Heider 1, Adriaan Spruyt 1, Arne Roets 2 and Sean Hughes 1
1 Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, 2Department of Developmental, Personality
and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
We introduce the Relational Responding Task (RRT) as a tool for capturing beliefs at
the implicit level. Flemish participants were asked to respond as if they believed that
Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants (e.g., respond “true” to the statement
“Flemish people are wiser than immigrants”) or to respond as if they believed that
immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people (e.g., respond “true” to the statement
“Flemish people are dumber than immigrants”). The difference in performance between
these two tasks correlated with ratings of the extent to which participants explicitly
endorsed the belief that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants and with
questionnaire measures of subtle and blatant racism. The current study provides a first
step toward validating RRT effects as a viable measure of implicit beliefs.
Keywords: implicit measures, racism, relational responding
Implicit measures have become an important part of the psychologist’s toolbox (see Nosek et al.,
2011; Gawronski and De Houwer, 2014, for recent reviews). Although opinions differ on what it
means to say that a measure is implicit, we favor the view that implicit measures are measurement
outcomes that capture the to-be-measured construct (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, evaluation) under
conditions of automaticity (e.g., even when participants have little time, are engaged in multiple
tasks, are not aware of what is being measured, or do not have the intention to express the con-
struct that is being measured; see De Houwer et al., 2009; De Houwer and Moors, 2012). In most
implicit measurement tasks, participants are asked to respond as quickly as possible to stimuli that
appear on a computer screen. For instance, in an Implicit Association Test (IAT) designed to assess
implicit self-esteem, positive words, negative words, stimuli related to the self (e.g., the first name
of the participant), and stimuli related to other people (e.g., the first name of another participant)
appear one by one on a computer screen. In a first critical block of trials, participants are asked to
press one key as quickly as possible whenever they see a positive word or a self-related stimulus and
a second key whenever they see a negative word or an other-related stimulus. In a second critical
block, positive words and other-related stimuli are assigned to the first key whereas negative words
and self-related items are assigned to the second key. Implicit self-esteem is inferred from the dif-
ference in performance in the two critical blocks. For instance, participants who perform better in
the first relative to the second block are assumed to havemore positive self-esteem than participants
who perform better in the second relative to the first block (e.g., Greenwald and Farnham, 2000).
A core property of most implicit measures is that they were designed to capture asso-
ciations between concepts while ignoring the way in which those concepts are related (see
Hughes et al., 2012, for a detailed overview). For instance, the propositional beliefs “I am
good” and “I want to be good” both involve a relation between “I” and “good” but differ with
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regard to the type of relation. Even though these beliefs are
fundamentally different and might coincide with entirely differ-
ent behaviors, an IAT cannot differentiate between them. The
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP), on the other
hand, does allow one to differentiate at the implicit level between
beliefs that differ only with regard to the relational component
(for an overview, see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010)1.
Consider a version of the IRAP designed to capture the belief
“I am good.” On each trial of this task, either “I am” or “I am
not” appears at the top of a computer screen along with a positive
or negative adjective in the middle of the screen (e.g., “good” or
“bad”). In this way, the task is comprised of four different types
of trials (I am + positive; I am + negative; I am not + positive; I
am not +negative). As with the IAT, there are two different types
of critical blocks. In one block of trials, participants are trained
to select the response “correct” on trials that are in line with the
belief “I am good” (i.e., I am + positive; I am not + negative)
and to respond “false” on trials that contradict this belief (i.e., I
am not + positive and I am + negative). In the second type of
blocks, responses need to be in line with the belief “I am bad”
(i.e., respond “correct” on I am not + positive and I am + nega-
tive trials and respond “false” on I am + positive and I am not +
negative trials). The better someone performs on the first type of
blocks relative to the second type of blocks, the stronger that per-
son is assumed to hold the belief “I am good” (relative to “I am
bad”)2 .
Importantly, this version of the IRAP can easily be redesigned
to capture the belief “I want to be good.” The only necessary
change is to replace the stimuli “I am” and “I am not” with the
stimuli “I want to be” and “I do not want to be,” respectively. Once
this change is in place, participants can be trained to select the
response “correct” on I want to be + positive and I do not want
to be+ negative trials and to select the response “false” on I want
to be + negative and I do not want to be + positive trials. During
a second type of blocks, they are required to select “correct” on
I want to be + negative and I do not want to be + positive trials
and to select “false” for I want to be + positive and I do not want
to be + negative trials. Comparing performance across these dif-
ferent types of blocks provides an index of the belief “I want to be
good” (relative to “I want to be bad”).
1Research on implicit measures has been conducted both within the cognitive and
the functional tradition in psychology (De Houwer, 2011; Hughes et al., 2011). The
term “implicit belief” could also be used either at the mental or at the functional
level of explanation. At the mental level, it refers to an automatically constructed
or activated propositional representation, that is, an informational unit in memory
that contains information about how concepts are related and that mediates the
impact of the environment on behavior by means of automatically operating men-
tal processes (see De Houwer, 2009, 2014). At the functional level, implicit beliefs
can be defined as specific patterns of (arbitrarily applicable) relational responding,
that is, behavior that is under the control of the relation between events. Given
the assumption that (arbitrarily applicable) relational responding is mediated by
propositional representations (Hughes et al., 2011), measures such as IRAP scores
can be conceptualized both as indices of relational responding (when adopting
a functional perspective) and as indices of propositional representations (when
adopting a mental perspective).
2It is also possible to calculate an IRAP score for each trial type separately, which
can be used an index for four different beliefs). In the foregoing example, these trial
types would be: “I am good,” “I am bad,” “I am not good,” and “I am not bad”(see
Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010).
The significance of distinguishing between different beliefs at
the implicit level was recently demonstrated in a study by Remue
et al. (2013; see also Remue et al., 2014). Their research was
triggered by the observation that implicit self-esteem as indexed
by IAT scores is as positive in dysphoric students and acutely
depressed patients as it is in non-dysphoric students or non-
depressed control participants (e.g., De Raedt et al., 2006). Remue
and colleagues tested the idea that standard implicit measures of
self-esteemmight reflect different types of beliefs in different par-
ticipants. For instance, in non-dysphoric students, positive self-
esteem IAT scores might reflect the belief “I am good” (i.e., actual
self-esteem) whereas the same score might reflect the belief “I
want to be good” (i.e., ideal self-esteem) in dysphoric students. In
line with this hypothesis, they observed that dysphoric students
had lower scores on an IRAP designed to capture the belief “I am
good” than on an IRAP designed to capture the belief “I want to
be good” whereas non-dysphoric students showed the reversed
pattern.
The IRAP has been used successfully in a wide variety of
contexts (see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes and Barnes-
Holmes, 2013, for reviews). Still it would be good to have alter-
native measures of implicit beliefs, if only to assess and control
for method specific variance. Moreover, the IRAP is often quite
difficult for participants to complete. Across many studies, a sub-
stantial part of the (university student) sample fails to complete
an IRAP (e.g., more than 20% of the students in the study of
Remue et al., 2013; see Hughes and Barnes-Holmes, 2013, Table 1,
for an overview). The difficulty of the IRAP originates—at least in
part—from the fact that the assignment of keyboard keys to the
“correct” and “false” response option typically varies from trial to
trial (e.g., press d for “correct” and k for “false” on trial n but press
d for “false” and k for “correct” on trial n+ 1). The assignment of
responses to different keys is varied in order to avoid a potential
confound between the function of the response (indicate “cor-
rect” or “false”) and its physical location (e.g., the “d” or “k” keys).
This confound could alter the encoding of the responses by allow-
ing participants to select a response on the basis of its spatial
properties (e.g., “if I am + positive, then press key d”) rather
than its meaning (e.g., “if I am + positive, then press correct”;
but see (Campbell et al., 2011), for data showing that keeping the
assignment of responses fixed does not necessarily reduce IRAP
effect sizes). Although it might be possible to avoid a high drop-
out rate by increasing prior exposure to the task or changing
properties of the procedure (see Vahey et al., 2010; Hughes and
Barnes-Holmes, 2013, for a discussion), the difficulty in complet-
ing an IRAP does constrain its utility, especially when using it via
online applications (in which case extensive training is often not
feasible) or with certain populations (e.g., clinical patients with
limited attentional or intellectual capacities).
In the present paper, we offer the Relational Responding Task
(RRT) as a novel measurement procedure that, like the IRAP, is
designed to capture specific beliefs at the implicit level. It retains
an essential ingredient of the IRAP—namely—the requirement
for participants to respond in-line with specific beliefs (e.g., “I
am good” or “I want to be good”). Unlike most instantiations of
the IRAP, the RRT involves the presentation of full statements
in the middle of the computer screen (e.g., “I like myself ”) and
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participants are explicitly instructed to act “as if ” they agree with
certain statements and disagree with others3. For instance, in
a first block, participants might be asked to respond as if they
believe that they are good by selecting “true” when presented
with statements that imply positive views of the self (e.g., “I
like myself ”) and by selecting “not true” when presented with
statements that imply negative views of the self (e.g., “I dislike
myself ”). In a second block, they would respond as if they believe
that they are bad by selecting “true” when presented with negative
self-related statements and “false” when presented with positive-
self related statements. The difference in performance between
these two types of blocks is assumed to provide a measure of the
extent to which participants believe that they are good.
In addition to differences in the type of stimuli used and the
nature of the instructions, the IRAP and RRT also differ in their
structural properties. In the RRT, the physical properties of the
correct and false response remain constant throughout the task.
On all trials, responding “true” is realized by pressing a first key
whereas responding “not true” is done by pressing a second key.
Recoding of the responses (e.g., in terms of physical location)
is discouraged, however, by including inducer trials on which
stimuli are presented that refer to the concepts “true” or “not
true” (e.g., words such as “correct” and “wrong”). Participants are
instructed to press one key for inducer stimuli that refer to “true”
and to press a second key for inducer stimuli that refer to “false.”
Similar inducer trials have been used successfully in other implicit
measurement procedures as a means to discourage recoding of
the responses (e.g., Extrinsic Affective Simon Task; De Houwer,
2003).
Interestingly, the inclusion of inducer trials results in the RRT
having a task structure that closely resembles the IAT. More
specifically, in both the RRT and the IAT, four categories of stim-
uli are assigned to two responses in a way that varies across
blocks. As a result, it is likely that the difficulty of performing an
RRT will be similar to the difficulty of performing an IAT. Given
that (a) attrition rates in IAT studies are typically low, that (b)
IATs have already been successfully administrated via the world
wide web on a large scale, and that (c) IATs have been used suc-
cessfully with a variety of populations (e.g., Nosek et al., 2007, for
a review), we believe that the convenience of use of the RRT will
be high, and in several respects, superior to that of the IRAP (at
least as currently instantiated).
Despite their structural similarity, it is important to realize
that the IAT is fundamentally different from the RRT (and IRAP)
in several ways. Most importantly, a typical IAT does not require
participants to relate the different categories that are used in the
IAT. In a self-esteem IAT, for example, participants can select the
correct response merely by identifying the individual category
that the presented stimulus is a member of (e.g., the word “me”
is a member of the category of stimuli labeled “self ”). In the RRT
(and the IRAP), on the other hand, participants can only select
the correct response based on the way that different stimuli are
related to one another. For instance, in an RRT designed to assess
3In many instantiations of the IRAP, participants are trained to respond in cer-
tain ways via error feedback rather than given explicit instructions about the
stimulus-response assignments
the belief “I am good,” a correct response does not simply depend
on the presence of specific stimuli (e.g., “I,” “am,” or “good”) but
on the relation between different stimuli (e.g., the statement “I
am good”). Moreover, the instruction to “act as if ” statements
are true or false encourages participants to relate the presented
statement with the categories “true” and “not true.” That is, par-
ticipants need to respond to a statement as being either true or
false based on the rule that is specified for each block of trials.
In sum, the RRT requires participants to respond in a complex
relational manner (hence the name relational responding task).
It is precisely this feature of the RRT that endows it with the
potential to capture individual beliefs that differ with regard to
the relational component (e.g., “I am good” vs. “I want to be
good”).
In the current paper, we set out to validate empirically the RRT
effect as an implicit measure of beliefs. Rather than immediately
testing the potential of the RRT to capture differences between
beliefs that vary only in their relational component (e.g., by com-
paring an RRT designed to capture the belief “I am good” with
an RRT that captures the belief “I want to be good”), we first
conducted a study that focused on a single belief and examined
whether an RRT measure of that belief correlates with criterion
variables (see De Houwer et al., 2009, for more information on
how to validate implicit measures). More specifically, we used
an RRT that was designed to capture the extent to which Flem-
ish participants hold the belief that Flemish people are more
intelligent than immigrants. The inducer stimuli were synonyms
of the concepts “true” or “false” that had to be categorized as
either “true” by pressing one key or as “false” by pressing another
key. Target trials involved the presentation of statements that
were either in line with the belief that Flemish people are more
intelligent that immigrants (e.g., “Flemish people are smarter
than immigrants,” “Immigrants are dumber than Flemish peo-
ple”) or in line with the belief that immigrants are more intelli-
gent than Flemish people (e.g. “Flemish people are dumber than
immigrants,” “Immigrants are smarter than Flemish people”).
In addition to practice blocks that contained either inducer
trials or target trials only, the RRT also included two types of
test blocks that contained both inducer and target trials. Dur-
ing the first type of test block, participants were asked to respond
to the target statements as if they believed that Flemish people
are more intelligent than immigrants (i.e., to respond “true” to
statements such as “Flemish people are smarter than immigrants”
and to respond “not true” to statements such as “Flemish people
are dumber than immigrants”; pro-Flemish block). In the second
type of test block, participants were asked to respond as if they
believed that immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish peo-
ple (i.e., to respond “not true” to statements like “Flemish people
are smarter than immigrants” and to respond “true” to state-
ments like “Flemish people are dumber than immigrants”; pro-
immigrant block). The difference in performance across these
two types of blocks is assumed to assess the belief that Flemish
people are more intelligent than immigrants.
In order to validate the RRT scores, we also asked partici-
pants to express on a rating scale the extent to which they believe
that Flemish people are more or less intelligent than immigrants.
Because implicit and explicit measures of the same construct
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 319
De Houwer et al. Relational responding task
typically converge to some extent (Nosek, 2007), we expected that
the RRT and rating measure would be correlated. Participants
also completed questionnaires designed to capture subtle, mod-
ern, and blatant forms of racism. Blatant racism is considered to
be a hot and direct form of racial prejudice, often referring to
beliefs about the (genetic) inferiority of the racial out-group. It
is typically associated with a strong opposition to any intimate
contact with the out-group. Subtle racism, on the other hand, is
a more cool and covert expression of racial prejudice, including
the idea that out-groups are poorly adapted to the ingroup’s tra-
ditional values, an exaggeration of cultural differences between
the in-group and the out-group, and the absence of positive emo-
tions (rather than the presence of negative emotions) toward the
out-group (see Pettigrew andMeertens, 1995). Similarly, modern
racism also refers to a more covert form of prejudice (as opposed
to the blatant, old-fashioned forms) but is distinct in that it taps
into beliefs that racial discrimination is no longer a problem (or
even does not exist anymore) and that out-groups (i.e., Black
people in the original work) have become too demanding and
are pushing for unfair advantages (McConahay, 1986). If a Flem-
ish person believes that Flemish people are more intelligent than
immigrants, this belief could be regarded as an instance of racial
prejudice, especially blatant/old-fashioned racism (e.g., McCona-
hay, 1986; Bobo and Kluegel, 1993). We therefore expected that
RRT scores would also correlate with scores on these racism
questionnaires, in particular blatant racism.
Finally, please note that we did not make predictions about
the direction or magnitude of the overall RRT score. First, the
overall RRT score in our study would probably be biased as the
result of order effects. We fixed the order of the blocks (i.e.,
all participants started with the pro-Flemish block) because we
were interested primarily in interindividual differences in RRT
scores, that is, we wanted to correlate RRT scores with other mea-
sures. Counterbalancing block order is known to increase error
variance (i.e., differences in scores between participants might
reflect not only differences in the to-be-measured attribute but
also differences in block order) and thus to lower correlations
(see Perugini and Banse, 2007, for a discussion and the recom-
mendation to fix block order). Because there are few studies
about the effect of block order on the validity of implicit mea-
sures (e.g., studies examining whether correlations with validity
criteria are stronger when starting with an attitude-inconsistent
vs. an attitude-consistent block), we did not have strong reasons
to select one of the two block orders but more or less randomly
decided to always start with the pro-Flemish block. More impor-
tantly, fixing the order of blocks complicates the interpretation
of overall scores because those scores could be influenced by the
order in which the blocks are completed. For instance, practice
with the stimulus-response mappings in the first critical block
might slow down responding in the second critical block during
which those mappings are reversed. On the other hand, perfor-
mance in the second critical block might be facilitated because
of practice effects (e.g., faster responding because items are more
familiar and thus easier to process). When block order is fixed, it
is impossible to determine to what extent the overall score reflects
the reversal of stimulus-response mappings, practice effects, or
the properties of the to-be-measured attribute. Hence, it is best
to refrain from interpreting the overall score when block order
is fixed. A second reason for refraining from an interpretation of
the overall RRT score is that, even without biases due to fixed
block order, it is difficult to determine the correct interpreta-
tion of the zero point on psychological measures (Blanton and
Jaccard, 2006).
Method
Participants
Forty-nine students at Ghent University (Mage = 23 years,
SDage = 4; five men) participated in exchange for e5. Ghent
University is situated in Flanders, which is the northern region
of Belgium. These participants were classified as being Flem-
ish because they indicated that Dutch (which is the dominant
language in Flanders) was their native language and that both
their parents were Flemish. The data of six other participants
who told the experimenter that they had at least one parent of
non-Belgian nationality or said that Dutch was not their (only)
native language, were excluded from the analysis. All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided
their informed consent before participating.
Materials
RRT
Ten words and 20 statements were used as stimuli. Five words
were related to “true” (the Dutch words “goed,” “juist,” “correct,”
“exact,” and “in orde”) and five words were related to “false” (the
Dutch words “mis,” “onjuist,” “incorrect,” “verkeerd,” and “fout”).
These words were presented during the inducer trials. Each of the
20 target statements (see Supplementary Material) related Flem-
ish people and immigrants to one another in terms of their intel-
ligence level, using five synonyms for intelligent (e.g., smarter)
and five synonyms to denote a lack of intelligence (e.g., dumber).
Ten statements implied that Flemish people are more intelligent
than immigrants (e.g., “Flemish people are smarter than immi-
grants,” “Immigrants are less clever than Flemish people”) while
another 10 statements implied that immigrants are more intelli-
gent than Flemish people (e.g., “Immigrants are wiser than Flem-
ish people,” “Flemish people are less wise than immigrants”). All
statements were presented in bold Verdana font, size 28. Inducer
stimuli were presented in orange, whereas target statements were
presented in blue throughout the task. The experiment was con-
ducted using a 17 inch LCD screen (60Hz, 1440 × 900 pixels).
The RRT program was written in Affect 4.0 (Spruyt et al., 2010),
a copy of which can be downloaded at http://www.liplab.ugent.
be/.
Questionnaires
Participants completed a 12-item subtle racism scale and an 8-
item blatant racism scale (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; adapted
by Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2005), along with a 10-item mod-
ern racism scale (McConahay, 1986; translated by Dhont et al.,
2010). Virtually all questions referred to immigrants in general,
with the exception of a few questions that referred to Turks
and Moroccans, the two largest groups of immigrants in Bel-
gium from outside of the European Union. Also, a few items
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stated that immigrants differ in their religious beliefs or culture
from Belgians, implying that immigrants do not include for-
eigners from other western European countries. Examples are
“Immigrants should be wise enough not to impose themselves at
places where they know beforehand that they would be discrimi-
nated” (subtle racism scale), “Discrimination against immigrants
no longer is problem in Belgium” (modern racism scale), and
“Immigrants are a threat to the employment of Belgians” (bla-
tant racism). Note that some questions referred to Belgian people
as the in-group whereas the RRT referred to Flemish people as
the in-group. If anything, this difference would reduce the mag-
nitude of the correlations between the racisms measures and the
RRT and thus work against our hypotheses. However, we did not
expect a strong negative impact of this divergence because our
participants are both Belgian and Flemish. Hence, both labels
describe the in-group correctly as opposed to the out-group of
immigrants.
All questions were rated on 7-point Likert scales ranging from
1 (“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely agree”). In addition,
participants were asked to provide their opinion on the relative
intelligence of Flemish people and immigrants using a scale that
ranged from -10 (immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish
people) to +10 (Flemish people are more intelligent than immi-
grants), with 0 indicating that the two groups do not differ in their
intelligence.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. All par-
ticipants first completed the RRT. They were instructed to cat-
egorize words and statements presented on the screen as either
“true” or “not true” by pressing the left or right control-keys of
the keyboard, respectively. In the first block (40 trials), each of the
10 inducer words was presented 4 times as practice. Participants
were asked to categorize the words as synonyms of “true” (press
right control key) and “not true” (press left control key). In the
second block of 40 trials, the 20 target statements were presented
twice. Participants were asked to respond to the statements in line
with the rule that Flemish people are more intelligent than immi-
grants (and immigrants are therefore less intelligent than Flemish
people). The third block consisted of two consecutive repetitions
of 40 trials, in which the 10 inducer stimuli were presented twice
and the 20 target statements were presented once, leading to a
total of 80 trials. Participants were asked to respond in accor-
dance with the rules practiced in the two preceding blocks. Block
4 was identical to the second block except for a reversal of the
rule for responding. That is, participants were asked to respond
as if immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish (and Flem-
ish are therefore less intelligent than immigrants). The fifth and
final block was identical to the third, but participants were asked
to respond to target statements in accordance with the response
rule learned in block four.
The order of the trials was random except for the restriction
that the same statement or word could not be presented on two
consecutive trials. Each trial started with the presentation of a
word or statement in the middle of the screen. It remained there
until a response was registered. Incorrect responses were followed
by the presentation of a red cross which remained on screen
until participants gave the appropriate response. The following
trial started 750ms after a correct response was emitted. Once
they completed the RRT, participants rated the target belief after
which they completed the three questionnaires (subtle, modern,
and blatant racism scale, in that order). They then were debriefed
and paid.
Results
RRT Data
Given that inducer trials were included merely to prevent
response recoding, only data from the target trials of the mixed
blocks were analyzed. Analyses that included also the data of the
inducer trials led to the same conclusions. The data from two
participants were excluded from the analyses because their per-
centage of errors was more than 2.5 standard deviations above
the mean percentage of errors of the total group. Reaction times
were defined as the time in milliseconds between the onset of
presentation of the statement and the registration of the cor-
rect response. These reaction times were transformed into DRRT
scores using the same improved D-algorithm (D1) that Green-
wald et al. (2003) developed for the IAT. The D1 score was chosen
because we recorded reaction times until the correct response
was emitted, thus removing the need for algorithms that add
extra penalty time to reaction times on trials with an incorrect
response. Analyses using the D4 (also known as D600) scoring
algorithm, led to similar conclusions. DRRT effects were scored so
that positive values indicated faster responses in the pro-Flemish
block (i.e., act as if Flemish people are more intelligent than
immigrants) relative the pro-immigrant block of the RRT (i.e., act
as if immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people) while
negative values indicated the opposite. The DRRT score ranged
from −0.79 to 0.56, with a mean DRRT score of M = −0.01
(SD = 0.34). The mean DRRT score did not differ significantly
from zero, t < 1. During the mixed blocks, participants on
average took 1551ms (SD = 373.93) to respond to the target
statements and 672ms (SD = 88.58) to respond to the inducer
words. In these blocks, they made on average 11.1% of errors
(SD = 0.06) on trials with target statements and 5.3% of errors
(SD = 0.04) on trials with inducer words.
Correlation Analyses
Table 1 provides an overview of all pairwise correlations between
the DRRT score, the explicit rating, and the three questionnaires.
TABLE 1 | Correlations between measures.
1 2 3 4 5
1 DRRT – 0.43* 0.36* 0.20 0.34*
2 Rating – 0.40* 0.31* 0.70*
3 Subtle racism – 0.74* 0.80*
4 Modern racism – 0.67*
5 Blatant racism –
*p < 0.05.
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Most importantly, the DRRT score correlated significantly with
the explicit judgments of the relative intelligence of Flemish and
immigrants, r = 0.43, t(44) = 3.17, p = 0.003, with the scores
on the subtle racism scale, r = 0.36, t(45) = 2.59, p = 0.013,
and with the scores on the blatant racism scale, r = 0.34,
t(45) = 2.39, p = 0.020. The correlations between the DRRT
score and those obtained from the modern racism scale did not
reach conventional levels of significance, r = 0.20, t(45) = 1.39,
p = 0.171.
Odd-even split half reliability of the RRT score, using
Spearman-Brown correction, was Rsb = 0.64. For the question-
naire of subtle, modern, and blatant racism, Chronbach’s alpha
was 0.85, 0.83, and 0.86, respectively. The mean value on those
questionnaires was 4.26 (SD = 0.86), 3.55 (SD = 0.87), and
2.61 (SD = 1.05), respectively. Finally, the mean score on the
explicit rating was 1.28 (SD = 1.05) which differed from zero,
t(45) = 4.41, p < 0.001.
Discussion
The current study sought to provide a first step toward the vali-
dation of the RRT effect as an implicit measure of beliefs. In line
with the hypothesis that the RRT scores capture the (prejudiced)
belief that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants,
we observed a significant correlation between RRT scores and
explicit ratings of how much participants endorsed this belief.
RRT scores also correlated positively with questionnaires of sub-
tle and blatant (but not modern) racism. This pattern of cor-
relations supports the claim that the RRT effects captured the
to-be-measured belief and hence provides preliminary evidence
for the idea that the RRT can provide a general tool for assessing
beliefs. In addition, the RRT seems to be more user friendly than
the IRAP. First, the attrition rate in our study was low. All partic-
ipants successfully completed the RRT. We did discard the data
of two participants because their percentage of errors was more
than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean percentage of errors
of the total group. However, this still implies an attrition rate of
less than 5% (i.e., 4.08%) whereas attrition rates of 20% or more
are common in IRAP studies. Moreover, participants needed only
about 10min to complete the RRT whereas it often takes 20min
or more to complete the various stages of the IRAP.
We not only put forward the claim that RRT scores capture
beliefs but also that they provide an implicit measure of those
beliefs. It has been argued that a measure qualifies as implicit if
it functions as a valid measure even under conditions of auto-
maticity (De Houwer et al., 2009; De Houwer and Moors, 2012).
Based on the structural features of the RRT, one could argue that
RRT scores provide an implicit measure in the sense that they
capture beliefs even though participants are asked to respond
quickly. Speed is of course a continuous variable, which implies
that measures differ in the degree to which they are implicit along
this criterion. In our study, for example, participants required an
average of 1551ms to respond to the target statements and 672ms
to respond to inducer words. Although 1551ms might seem long
relative to the reaction times observed in most other implicit
measurement tasks, the target statements used in our study are
much more complex than the single words or pictures that are
usually presented in other implicit measurement tasks. Hence,
it seems likely that participants did respond very quickly once
they processed the meaning of the statements. Consistent with
this conclusion, reaction times on inducer trials (during which
participants reacted to individual words) were much shorter and
comparable to those seen in other implicit measurement tasks.
Regardless of how RRT scores relate to other implicit measures
in this regard, it seems safe to argue that RRT scores are more
implicit in terms of speed than scores obtained from traditional
self-report procedures (e.g., ratings, questionnaires) that allow
for ample time to reflect and respond to questions.
Are RRT measures implicit in the sense of unintentional?
Unlike explicit measures such as the rating measures used in our
study, participants are not asked to express their beliefs during
an RRT. Instead, they are simply asked to act as if they endorse
a certain belief. On the one hand, when asked to act in ways that
contradict their beliefs, it is unlikely that participants will express
those beliefs in an intentional manner because this would lead to
incorrect responses. On the other hand, when asked to respond
in line with beliefs that they do endorse, it is possible (but not
necessarily the case) that participants do express their beliefs in
an intentional manner rather than act as if they endorse those
beliefs. Hence, at present, it is difficult to make strong claims
about whether RRT measures are implicit in the sense of valid
in the absence of the intention to express a belief. Future work
could examine this issue further by determining the strategies
that participants use while completing an RRT. Such work could
also examine if the RRT meets other conditions of automaticity,
such as controllability.
What would it mean to say that RRT scores capture beliefs at
the implicit level? One way to conceptualize this statement is in
terms of the implicit endorsement of propositions. At first sight,
the idea that propositions can be endorsed implicitly might seem
self-contradictory in light of cognitive theories that postulate that
all implicit processing relies on associative representations (e.g.,
Rydell and McConnell, 2006). Unlike propositions, associations
do not have a truth value: an association does not imply a state-
ment about the world and is therefore neither true nor untrue.
Hence, associations as such cannot be endorsed (i.e., be evaluated
as true).4 Together, these two assumptions (all implicit process-
ing relies on associations; associations cannot be endorsed) imply
that endorsement can never be implicit.
More recently, however, cognitive researchers have raised
the possibility that implicit processing can involve propositional
representations (Hughes et al., 2011, 2012; De Houwer, 2014).
Indeed, a rapidly growing body of evidence supports the conclu-
sion that propositions can be both formed and activated under
the various conditions of automaticity (see De Houwer, 2014,
for a review). At the same time, Shidlovski et al. (2014), recently
advanced the concept of “implicit truth” which they define as
the automatic endorsement of propositions. Across several stud-
ies, the authors showed that indices of implicit truth can be
dissociated from the explicit endorsement of truth. From this
perspective, scores on the RRT (and IRAP) do have a unique
4The proposition that an association exists can be endorsed but the association
itself cannot.
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and potentially crucial role to fulfill in psychological research as
measures of the implicit endorsement of propositions.
One could argue, however, that the IRAP and RRT are not
alone in their ability to capture beliefs at the implicit level. For
instance, several variants of the IAT use categories that spec-
ify relational information. Consider the so-called personalized
IAT (pIAT) in which participants classify (attribute) stimuli as
instances of the categories “I like” or “I dislike” rather than the
categories “good” or “bad” (Olson and Fazio, 2004; see Dewitte
and De Houwer, 2008; Yoshida et al., 2012, for related proposi-
tionalized variants of the IAT). For instance, in a smoking pIAT
(e.g., De Houwer et al., 2006), participants see words that refer
to things they like (e.g., flowers), words that refer to things they
dislike (e.g., cockroaches), pictures related to smoking (e.g., a
lighter), and pictures unrelated to smoking (e.g., a pencil). One
could argue that, in this case, the categorization of words is no
longer based on category membership as such (i.e., good, bad,
or I) but rather on the basis of the relation between different
concepts (“I” in combination with “like” or “dislike”).
Nevertheless, while performance in the pIAT might be rela-
tionally more complex than performance on traditional IATs,
the pIAT remains fundamentally different from the RRT (and
IRAP). Like other IATs, the pIAT does not require participants to
relate the different components of a to-be-measured belief. For
instance, in a smoking pIAT, response selection is determined on
the basis of individual elements of the beliefs “I like smoking”
or “I dislike smoking” (i.e., the individual categories “I like,” “I
dislike,” “smoking,” or “non-smoking”). In the RRT, on the other
hand, response selection is instructed in terms of the full com-
bination of these elements (i.e., “I like smoking” or “I dislike
smoking”). Moreover, as we pointed out in the introduction, in
the RRT but not in IATs, participants are instructed to respond
on the basis of whether a statement is to be considered as true or
false in a specific block of trials.
The autobiographical IAT (aIAT; see Verschuere et al., 2015,
for a review) is another variant of the IAT that might allow
for the measurement of beliefs and seems to bear even greater
similarity to the RRT at the structural level than other IATs. In
an aIAT, participants encounter generic statements that are true
(e.g., “I am a human being”) or false (e.g., “I am a cow”) for
all participants. They are required to classify these statements
as either “true” or “false” by pressing one of two keys. Partici-
pants also see statements that describe a particular event (Event
A) that the participant has witnessed (autobiographical items;
e.g., statements related to a crime) or a second event (Event B)
that the participant has not witnessed (control items). In one
of the critical test blocks, participants press the same key for
true items and items referring to Event A and a second key for
false items and items referring to Event B. In the second crit-
ical test block, the stimulus-response assignments are reversed
(press the first key for true items and Event B items; press the
second key for false items and Event A items). As is the case
for the pIAT, the aIAT is relationally more complex than tradi-
tional IATs. Most importantly, in the aIAT, participants respond
to statements (i.e., combinations of items) rather than individ-
ual elements of a statement. Nevertheless, unlike the RRT, the
aIAT does not require participants to relate all elements of the
to-be-measured belief (e.g., “Event A is true”) because responses
can be selected on the basis of the individual elements of that
belief (e.g., “Event A” or “true”). Therefore, like all other variants
of the IAT, the aIAT does not require participant to respond on
the basis of whether a statement is to be considered as true or
false.
The fact that the RRT is fundamentally different from both the
pIAT and aIAT does not, however, allow for the conclusion that
only the RRT can be used to capture beliefs at the implicit level.
In fact, we believe that scores on the pIAT, aIAT, and even tradi-
tional IATs reflect beliefs (also see De Houwer, 2014). Although
IATs do not require participants to relate all elements of a to-be-
measured belief, participants might still relate those elements to
one another, either explicitly or implicitly. Take the self-esteem
IAT that wementioned in the introduction. Rather than respond-
ing to self-related items merely on the basis of the fact that the
item refers to oneself, participants could recode the task in such
a way that they respond to self-related items as positive items
(i.e., based on the fact that self-related items such as “I” have a
positive valence for the participant). This would imply that self-
related items are responded to in terms of how they relate to
positive and negative valence, which could reflect beliefs about
those items (e.g., “I like myself ”). Importantly, the way in which
items are responded to can vary in implicit, unintentional ways.
For instance, participants might sometimes erroneously classify
self-related items on the basis of their valence even when they do
not have the intention to do so. In fact, one of the most success-
ful accounts of the IAT implies that IAT effects are due to such
instances of task misapplication (i.e., Klauer and Mierke, 2005).
Hence, IAT effects might well reflect the implicit (in the sense of
fast and unintentional) endorsement of propositions.
Because traditional IATs do not incorporate any information
about the relation between the different categories, different par-
ticipants might (implicitly or explicitly) relate the categories of
the IAT in different ways. For instance, whereas non-dysphoric
students might relate items that refer to the self and positive
items in terms of liking (i.e., respond to items in terms of whether
they refer to something you like), dysphoric students might relate
those items in terms of aspirations (i.e., respond to items in terms
of whether they are something you want). Although this idea
leaves open the question of why dysphoric and non-dysphoric
participants differ in this manner, it is in line with the fact that
self-esteem IAT scores do not differ between those participants
even though all other evidence leads to the conclusion that dys-
phoric participants do have lower self-esteem (De Raedt et al.,
2006). It is also in line with the IRAP findings of Remue and
colleagues (Remue et al., 2013, 2014) which suggest that dyspho-
ric and non-dysphoric students do indeed differ in their implicit
endorsement of the propositions “I am good” and “I want to be
good.” From this perspective, pIATs and aIATs differ from tradi-
tional IATs in that the former are more likely to guide the way
in which participants relate the different categories by specifying
the precise way in which those stimuli should be related (e.g., “I
like” or “I dislike”).
In short, it seems reasonable to assume that scores on IATs
(and other implicit measures; see DeHouwer, 2014) reflect beliefs
at the implicit level. Still, the RRT is likely to have advantages over
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other implicit measures when it comes to capturing beliefs. Most
importantly, because the RRT requires participants to relate the
elements of beliefs in a highly specific manner, the RRT offers
more control over the way that participants relate stimuli and
thus over the type of beliefs that scores on the RRT capture. Of
course, whether the RRT (or IRAP) outperforms the IAT as an
implicit measure of beliefs is an empirical issue.
Finally, a reviewer alerted us to the fact that the RRT bears
some resemblance to one particular variant of the IRAP in which
participants are cued to lie or respond truthfully (Levin et al.,
2010). When the word LIE is presented on the screen, partici-
pants select response “similar/yes” if they consider the two con-
cepts on the screen to be dissimilar (e.g., “addict” and “good”) and
to select the response “dissimilar/no” if they consider the con-
cepts to be similar (e.g., “addict” and “bad”). On trials with the
word TRUTH, “similar/yes” has to be selected for similar pairs
and “dissimilar/no” for dissimilar pairs. Unlike to what is the case
in the RRT, in this variant of the IRAP, the experimenter does not
determine which responses are correct or incorrect. Instead, it is
the participant who first has to decide what is true for him or her,
after which he or she can select the response in line with the cue
on that trial (TRUTH or LIE). Hence, this version of the IRAP
seems to tap into how well people can intentionally lie about
their beliefs (relative to telling the truth). In the RRT, on the other
hand, participants are instructed by the experimenter to respond
in a particularmanner thatmight be either consistent or inconsis-
tent with the beliefs of the participant. The task does not require
participants to decide what their beliefs are. Which responses
qualify as correct depends entirely on the experimenter. As such,
RRT effects do not capture the ability to lie in an intentional man-
ner (i.e., to retrieve and then conceal the truth) but the ability to
act in ways that are consistent or inconsistent with a belief one
might have. Although it needs to be settled empirically which of
the two tasks is more valid and useful, this variant of the IRAP
does differ from the RRT in non-trivial ways. Moreover, as is the
case in most instantiations of the IRAP, attrition rates in this vari-
ant were very high (25%), probably because of the trial-by-trial
changes in the location of the response options and the nature of
response cue. Because we observed much a lower attrition rate in
our RRT study, it does seem to be the case that the RRT is more
user friendly than the variant of the IRAP that was introduced by
Levin et al. (2010).
To conclude, the present paper introduces the RRT as a tool
for obtaining an implicit measure of beliefs. We reported a first
study in which the RRT was used to measure the extent to which
Flemish participants hold the belief that Flemish people are more
intelligent than immigrants. As expected, scores on the RRT cor-
related with ratings of how much participants explicitly endorse
this belief. Also correlations with questionnaires of racism were
observed. Although these findings provide initial evidence for
the claim that the RRT provides a way to capture beliefs, more
research is clearly needed, especially research in which RRT
scores are related with real-life behavior. Indeed, it might well be
that RRT effects allow one to predict unique variance in behav-
ior that cannot be predicted on the basis of explicit measures of
beliefs. Such an added value is likely to arise in situations where
implicitly endorsed propositions differ from explicitly endorsed
propositions (see Shidlovski et al., 2014). Future work will also
need to substantiate the claim that RRT scores qualify as an
implicit measure of beliefs and to compare the RRT with other
potential implicit measures of beliefs. Moreover, it would be
good to directly compare RRT measures with other measures
in terms of validity, utility, and employability. By providing the
first step in the validation process, however, the present paper
highlights the potential of the RRT and sets the stage for such
work.
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